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Used Products and Strict Liability: A Practical
Approach to a Complex Problem
From early times common-law judges have been concerned
about the liability of those who manufacture and sell products
to the public.' In 1916, Justice Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co.' revolutionized the field of products liability.
The decision imposed liability on the manufacturer of a product
which was "reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril"
despite the absence of privity between the injured consumer and
Since MacPherson, courts have tended to
the manufa~turer.~
move away from the older and sometimes more troublesome theories of negligence and warranty and have imposed strict liability on manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers.' In the past
decade, proponents of the theory have argued, with varying success, that strict liability should be imposed in new areas of consumer protection: leasing,' services,@
and sales of used products.'
This Comment will address the application of strict liability
to sellers of used products, a developing area of the law in which
courts have reached conflicting and often confusing results. Two
early cases, Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Comaand Turner v. International Harvester Co.,@examined the public policies underlying strict liability and its application to the sellers of
used goods. The Turner Court concluded that the sellers should
1. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS5 402A, Comment b (1965).
2. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, 175 N.Y.S. app. 382 (1916).
3. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053, 175 N.Y.S. app. at 389.
4. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, he., 59 Cal. 2d 57,377 P.2d 897,27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
OF THE LAWOF TORTS654-57 (4th ed. 1971).
(1960). See also W. PROSSER,HANDBOOK
5. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
6. Raritan Trucking Corp. v. Aero Commander, Inc., 458 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1972);
Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969). See also Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied Warranties and Strict Liability in
Tort, 1974 UTAHL. REV.661.
7. Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (1975).
See also Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 337 (1973).
8. 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975).
9. 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (1975).
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be held strictly liable; the Peterson court, that they should not.1°
To further confuse the matter, some courts appeared to reason
that the possible application of strict liability to sellers of used
products was a "yes or no," "black or white" question." Some
made no substantial analyses of the policy considerations.12 To
make matters worse, the treatise writers, along with the draftsmen of the Uniform Product Liability Law, offered no concrete
solutions to the problem of whether to extend strict liability to
sellers of used products.13
There are probably two major reasons for the confusion in
this area of the law: (1)The courts often disagree on what public
policies support the imposition of strict liability upon sellers of
used products;14 and (2) unlike sellers of new products, who
through indemnification can pass back losses to the entities responsible, sellers of used goods will face difficulty in obtaining
indemnification or may be denied indemnification altogether. It
is therefore difficult to determine what legal burdens the class of
sellers of used products can and should bear."
Imposing strict liability on sellers of used products presents
10. For discussions of these cases, see Metzger, Products Liability and the Seller of
Used Goods, 15 AM. Bus. L.J. 159 (1977); Comment, Sales of Defective Used Products:
Should Strict Liability Apply?, 52 S. CAL.L. REV.805 (1979); Note, Strict Liability Not
Applicable to Used Car Dealers Absent Actual Creation of Defect, 25 DE PAULL. REV.
574 (1976); Note, Strict Products Liability for Used Car Dealers, 63 KY.L.J. 826 (1975);
Note, Seller of Used Product with Safety Defect May be Held Strictly Liable in Tort
for Personal Injuries, 7 RUT.-CAM.L.J. 405 (1976); Note, Turner v. International Harvester Company: Strictly Speaking, Can Section 402A Be Extended to Hold Used Car
Dealers Liable in Tort?, 21 S.D.L. REV.468 (1976); Note, Strict Liability is Imposed on
the Sellers of a Defective Used Product, 8 ST. MARY'SL.J. 196 (1976); Note, Strict LiaL. REV.426 (1975); Note,
bility in Tort Applied to Seller of Used Automobile, 42 TENN.
Dealer-Seller of Used Car Held Strictly Liable in Tort Under Section 402A, 10 TULSA
L.J. 709 (1975).
11. See, e.g., Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785
(1975); Lewis v. E.F. Moore, Inc., 87 Montgomery County L. Rpts. 379,42 Pa. D. & C.2d
614 (1967).
12. See, e.g., Lewis v. E.F. Moore, Inc., 87 Montgomery County L. Rpta. 379,42 P a
D. & C.2d 614 (1967); McLain v. Hodge, 474 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). But see
Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975); Turner v.
International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (1975).
& M. FRIEDMAN,
PRODUCTS
LIA13. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714,62,718 (1979); 2 L. FRUMER
B a r n $16A[4][b][iv] (1980 & Supp. 1980); W. KIMBLE
& R. LESHER,
PRODUCTS
LIABILITY
5 64 (1979).
14. See the five opinions of the seven members of the Oregon Supreme Court in
Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259, 509 P.2d 529 (1973). See also Hovenden v.
Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
15. See Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill. 2d 17, 20-21, 329 N.E.2d
785, 787 (1975).
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the overall question of whether to create an essentially new
cause of action. Manufacturers and sellers of new products are
presently held liable only for design and manufacturing defects,
while sellers of used products may also be held strictly liable for
some defects that arise after the products leave the original distribution chain.16 Two recent cases have suggested a partial solution to this complex problem. When injuries from used products
are caused by design and manufacturing defects, these cases call
for a conditional imposition of strict liability to be applied only
when there is a special relationship between the seller of used
goods and the manufacturer or when the used-products seller
makes representations that make him an insurer of the product.'' However, these cases do not solve the problem of liability
of sellers of used goods for defects which arise after the product
has left the original chain of distribution. One court has addressed the latter problem and suggested limiting liability for
these subsequently occurring defects to "safety defects," or defects in those parts of the used products ordinarily expected to
receive regular maintenance and replacement?
This Comment suggests that these two developing lines of
argument be combined, and that in light of public policy considerations, strict liability should be imposed on sellers of used
products as follows:
1. Enterprise liability should be and is the major policy underlying strict products liability and in general justifies imposing
strict liability on sellers of used products.
2. In the case of design and manufacturing defects, enterprise liability does not justify imposing unconditional strid
products liability on sellers of used products since manufacturers are already required to insure all of society against accidents
resulting from such defects. Therefore, in the case of sellers of
used products, strict products liability should be imposed for design and manufacturing defects only when there is a special relationship between the seller of used goods and the manufacturer
or when the used-products seller makes representations which
16. Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 290, 336 A.2d 62, 69
(1975); Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302, 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
17. Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 286 Or. 747, 757, 596 P.2d 1299, 1304 (1979);
Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 3d 268, 282, 161 Cal.
Rptr. 789, 797 (1980).
18. Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 290, 336 A.2d 62, 69
(1975). See also Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785
(1976) (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
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make him an insurer of the product.
3. Where defects arise after the products leave the original
chain of distribution, the seller of used goods should be liable for
them only when they existed at the time of sale and the injury
was caused by a "safety defect."

Throughout this Comment, the term seller or dealer will refer to an individual or organization that is engaged in the business of selling either new or used products.la The term defect
will refer to an unreasonably dangerous condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer of the product.20 The term
safety defect will refer to a defect that arises after a product has
left the original distribution chain and occurs in a part of the
product which a consumer should reasonably expect to have
been regularly maintained or replaced. A safety defect can occur
only in a part vital to the safe operation of the product which
must be regularly maintained or replaced to avoid injury to the
consumer and innocent third parties.

This Comment will briefly discuss the various policies underlying strict products liabilitfl and then apply them to explain why and to what extent strict products liability should be
imposed on sellers of used products. Legal scholars have formulated a number of policy justifications for strict products liability," including enterprise liability, risk spreading or distribution, deterrence or safety incentives, representation theory or
implied representation, and compensation of the victim.
Enterprise liability. An enterprise engaged in selling prod19. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS
§ 402A (l)(a), & Comment f (1965).
OF TORTS§ 402A, Comments g & i (1965).
(SECOND)
20. RESTATEMENT
21. See Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62
(1974); Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 286 Or. 747, 596 P.2d 1299 (1979); Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259, 509 P.2d 529 (1973). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF
TORTS5 402A, Comment c (1965).
22. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALEL.J. 499 (1961); Cowan, Some Policy Buses of Products Liability, 17 STAN.L. REV.
1077 (1965);Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEX.L. REV. 1185, 1189 (1976); Whitford, Strict Products Liability and the
Automobile Industry: Much Ado About Nothing, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 83,92-94; Comment,
Sales of Defective Used Products: Should Strict Liability Apply?, 52 S. CAL.L.REV. 805
(1979). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS5 402A, Comment c (1965).
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ucts will introduce certain injuries or costs associated with those
products into society. The enterprise therefore should be required to reflect in its prices the costs of the injuries those products may cause to consumers. These costs will generally be reflected in the enterprise's insurance premium payments?
Products that cause more injuries will have higher insurance
premiums and higher prices. The increased price of such products will encourage consumers to purchase safer products with
lower prices?
Risk spreading or distribution. As a general rule, those who
are in the business of selling products are in a better position
that individual buyers to spread the costs of compensating for
injuries (i.e., insurance costs) and therefore should be required
to spread these costs among their entire clientele."
Deterrence or safety incentive. Placing strict liability for
design and manufacturing defects on the manufacturer and
those in the original chain of distribution will create a strong
incentive among retailers and manufacturers, all of whom may
be held liable, to discourage the manufacture of defective products and to encourage the manufacture of safer, trouble-free

Implied representation. By placing a new product on the
market, the retailer and manufacturer impliedly represent that
the product is safe if used in a normal and non-abusive manner.
If the product falls short of the implied representation, the seller
or manufacturer should be held strictly liable to the injured consumer or user?
23. Calabresi, supra note 22, at 499-501; Whitford, supra note 22, at 92-94.
24. Calabresi, supra note 22, at 502, 514; Comment, Sales of Defective Used Products: Should Strict Liability Apply?, supra note 22, at 811-13.
25. See Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 286 Or. at 753-54, 596 P.2d at 1303. See also
Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM.
L. REV.444, 456-60 (1923).
26. Justice Schaefer stated in Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d
339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969), "The strict liability of a retailer arises from his integral role
in the overall producing and marketing enterprise and affords an additional incentive to
safety." Id. at 344,247 N.E.2d at 404 (emphasis added). Justice Traynor in Vandermark
v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256,391 P.2d 168,37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964), also noted, "In
other cases the retailer himself may play a substantial part in insuring that the product
is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end; the
retailer's strict liability thus serves as an added incentive to safety." Id. at 262, 391 P.2d
a t 171-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
27. Discussing this representational theory, Professor Leon Green wrote,
For a long while, reliance upon warranties and the duty of care has given only
nominal protection to the injured consumer. Why not simply say to sellers:
From this day we shall take you at your word. If your products
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Compensation of the victim. An injured victim should be
able to obtain compensation as easily as possible. Because strict
liability requires no proof of negligence, it simplifies the victim's
burden and facilitates his rec~very.'~

A. Strict Liability for Design or Manufacturing Defects

In light of the public policies outlined, this Comment concludes that the imposition of strict liability on sellers of used
products is justified in limited circumstances. The discussion
that follows will first consider the imposition of strict liability on
sellers of used goods when design or manufacturing defects are
present and then will treat the imposition of strict liability on
sellers of used products when defects arise after the product
leaves the original distribution chain.
Enterprise liability. A number of courts have taken the position that enterprise liability should be and is the foremost
public policy mandating the imposition of strict liability on
manufacturers and retailers for design and manufacturing defects. However, in the case of sellers of used products, enterprise
liability should not be the sole basis for imposing strict liability.
To require sellers of used goods to purchase insurance and reflect in their prices the "costs" of design and manufacturing
defects will cause an "overstating" of those costs.2e That is,
under present strict liability case law, manufacturers and retailers maintain insurance to compensate society for design and
manufacturing defects that cause injuries. Sellers of used goods
should not be required to carry "overlapping" insurance to cover
the same defects and the same injuries. If such "overlapping"
insurance is forced on the used-products industry, both sellers
and consumers will be required to spend more money than is
actually needed to protect society against design and manufacturing defects. The resulting higher prices will lower demand in
in their normal use injure the qnsumer because of their dangerously
defective condition or because you have neither adequately warned
the consumer of the danger of their consumption nor directed him
how they should be used, the risk is yours.
Green, supra note 22, at 1191.
28. Cronin v. J.B.E.Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 442 (1972).
29. For a discussion of "overstated coats" and enterprise liability, see Calabresi,
supra note 22, at 543-44.
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the used-products industry and may create hardships for consumers, who will be forced to pay more for used products.
Fairness considerations also militate against the use of enterprise liability as the sole justification for imposing strict liability on used-products sellers for design and manufacturing defects. In general, "fault" has no place in pure enterprise
liability.30At the same time, however, enterprise liability should
not be used to impose an unnecessary burden on a used-goods
seller when the injured consumer has a viable cause of action
against the manufacturer himself. In struggling with this problem of fault, the Oregon Supreme Court in Tillman v. Vance
Equipment Co." imposed strict liability only conditionally. In
Tillman, the Oregon Supreme Court held that a seller of used
products would be held liable for design defects only if (1)the
seller, by making representations to the buyer, became an insurer of the product's safety, or (2) the seller was in a special
position with the manufacturer, such as a francised seller of new
and used automobiles. In Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court," Justice Potter of the Second District California
Court of Appeal discussed the Tillman decision:
The rule stated in Tillman is consistent with the policy
underlying the doctrine of strict liability as developed in this
state and most recently announced by our Supreme Court [in
Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245,466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr.
178 (1970)l. In holding the volume lessor of tank trucks strictly
liable for defects in the equipment provided therewith, the
[California Supreme] court stated that "the paramount policy
to be promoted by the rule is the protection of otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing defects and the spreading
throughout society of the cost of compensating them." [citations omitted]. The [California Supreme] court did not, however, abandon all other considerations. In particular, it affirmed the continued vitality of the requirement that the
imposition of liability "works no injustice to the
defendants."99

Because imposing strict liability on the sellers of used goods
solely on the basis of enterprise liability may be wasteful and
unjust, the courts must look to other policy considerations in de30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 500.
286 Or. 747, 596 P.2d 1299 (1979).
101 Cal. App. 3d 268, 161 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1980).
Id. at 283, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 798 (emphasis added).
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ciding under what conditions strict liability should be imposed
on sellers of used goods for design and manufacturing defects?
Risk spreading or distribution. It is undoubtedly true that,
as a class, sellers of used products are capable of spreading the
costs of injuries or i n s u r a n ~ e However,
.~
even though a usedproducts seller can spread the risks or costs of injuries his products may cause, risk spreading should not be used as a justification for imposing strict products liability on a used-products
seller for the same reason that enterprise liability is not a valid
justification-it
results in wasteful, "overlapping" insurance
costs. This is so because imposition of strict liability on sellers of
new products already provides the mechanism for insuring society against design and manufacturing defects.
Deterrence or safety incentive. Since sellers of used products do not manufacture new products and often operate independently from the manufacturer, imposing strict liability upon
them will not create greater incentives to manufacture non-de34. Critics may argue that this approach is unjust as to some injured consumers
because they will have no direct action against a defunct corporation and thus will have
no remedy. However, as a matter of general corporate law, there are five situations in
which an acquiring or surviving corporation will assume the liabilities of a "target" or
purchased corporation: (1) In a statutory merger, (2) in a de facto merger, (3) when fraud
is present, (4) when the surviving corporation expressly or impliedly agrees to assume
the liabilities of the purchased corporation, and (5) when the surviving corporation and
the purchased corporation are owned and operated by the same people, who merely continue the business. Thus, even though the corporation which manufactured the defective
product is no longer in business, it is likely that the victim will still have a cause of
action against an existing corporation.
35. See 286 Or. at 754, 596 P.2d at 1303. There will be cases, however, when some
used-products sellers, because of the small size of their businesses, may not be able to
effectively "spread the risks." A small business engaged in selling used products may
remain competitive and attractive to consumers only because it sells products cheaply. It
is possible, therefore, that by requiring a small business to "spread the risks" or costs of
an accident (through increased insurance premium costs), a court may be requiring the
sole proprietor or small businessman to bear the costs himself. C. Robert Morris, Jr.
expressed this concern in Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The
Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALEL.J. 554, 584-85 (1961):
The entrepreneur theory also attempts to gain credence by invoking the
concept of commutative justice. Though the entrepreneur himself is relatively
blameless, his enterprise entails a certain amount of risk, and it is proper to
place the burden of this risk upon him in the first instance, because he can
pass it on to his customers. . . .

....
. . . [But] it is probable that customers will not suffer the entire burden of

enterprise liability. Prices, after all, are determined by the interaction of supply and demand. If demand remains stable, an industry cannot raise its prices
without also decreasing its sales.
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fective products? However, where the used-products sellers are
in a special relationship with the manufacturers, imposing strict
liability on them will create an incentive to produce safer products similar to the incentive created when retailers of new goods
are held strictly liable. Thus, where the used-products seller sells
both new and used products of the manufacturer and is able to
impose leverage on the manufacturer through a contractual or
legal right of indemnification, the used-products seller should be
held strictly liable for design and manufacturing defects."
Implied representation. The theory of implied representation is generally inapplicable to the sales of used goods. Usedgoods dealers seldom represent that used products will conform
to any particular safety levels? However, sellers of used goods
occasionally make oral or written representations that give rise
to expectations on the part of consumers that the products sold
are as safe as similar new products. In those cases, the sellers
have made assurances which should make them liable as insurers of their products, not on the basis of implied representations,
36. In Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 286 Or. 747, 596 P.2d 1299 (1979), the Oregon
Supreme Court noted:
As to the risk-reduction aspect of strict products liability, the position of
the used-goods dealer is normally entirely outside the original chain of distribution of the product. As a consequence, we conclude, any risk reduction
which would be accomplished by imposing strict liability on the dealer in used
goods would not be significant enough to justify our taking that step. The
dealer in used goods generally has no direct relationship with either manufacturers or distributors. Thus, there is no ready channel of communication by
which the dealer and the manufacturer can exchange information about p q i ble dangerous defects in particular product lines or about actual and potential
liability claims.
Id. at 756, 596 P.2d at 1304.
L & R.
E LESHER,
supra note 13, g 275, a t 309 where the rule of
37. See W. ~
indemnification in strict products liability is set forth:
[Tlhe general rule is that indemnification is proper in such a case. This is permitted because of the policy of the law that seeks to place final responsibility
in such instances upon the party who was initially responsible for placing the
defective product into the stream of commerce-the party at the beginning of
the chain of distribution; usually the manufacturer. In accordance with this
reasoning, it has been held that not only may a retailer obtain indemnification
from the manufacturer of a defective product, but the manufacturer of a
finished product is entitled to indemnity from the manufacturer of a component part that was defective at the time it was received and installed as part of
the finished product [footnotes omitted].
See also Texaco, Inc., v. McGrew Lumber Co., 117 Ill. App. 2d 351, 254 N.E.2d 584
(1969).
38. See 286 Or. at 753-56, 596 P.2d at 1303-04.
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but on the basis of explicit guarantee^.^@
Compensation of the victim. Strict liability makes it somewhat easier for victims to obtain compensation. As a result, the
need to compensate victims should prompt the courts to impose
strict liability whenever it is justified in light of the above discussed public policies. Compensation, however, should not be
the foremost policy justifying strict liability. This would lead to
absolute liability.
In summary, to impose strict liability on a seller of used
products when design or manufacturing defects are present, the
plaintiff bears the burden of showing:
1. That the product was defective, i.e., unreasonably dangerous when sold to him because of a design or manufacturing
defect; and,
2. That the seller of used products is in a special relationship with the manufacturer, or,
3. That the seller represented to the consumer that he
would insure the safety of the product or that the product was
free of defects for normal use purposes.

In defense the defendant may rebut any of the plaintiffs
allegations and may bring forth the usual defenses of assump39. In Tillman, the Supreme Court of Oregon enumerated what kinds of representations might give rise to liability:
Those [used-products] markets, generally speaking, operate on the apparent
understanding that the seller, even though he is in the business of selling such
goods, makes no particular representation about their quality simply by offering them for sale. If a buyer wants some assurance of quality, he typically either bargains for it in the specific transaction or seeks out a dealer who routinely offers it (by, for example, providing a guarantee, limiting his stock of
goods to those of a particular quality, advertising that his used goods are apecially selected, or in some other fashion).
Id. at 755, 596 P.2d at 1303.
In Tauber-Arons, the Second District California Court of Appeals discussed liability
arising from representation:
As regards defects created by the original manufacturer, Tillman states a
sound rule limiting W i t y of dealers in used equipment. Under the rule as
stated, a Cadillac dealer who promotes the sale of new Cadillacs by offering
"near new trade-ins" which are represented as "specially selected" may incur
liability in respect of an original design defect in a car which he did not originally sell, both as a participant in the enterprise that created consumer demand and by generating "the kind of expectations of safety that the courts
have held are justifiably created by the introduction of a new product into the
stream of commerce." (Id., 596 P.2d at 1304.) The ordinary used products
dealer, however, will not be strictly liable for such defecta created by the
manufacturer.
101 Cal. App. 3d at 282, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
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tion of the risk and misuse of the product?O

B. Strict Liability and Safety Defects
Courts do not always make clear what policies underlie the
imposition of strict liability in individual cases. However, it appears that based on Comment c of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, many courts have recognized enterprise
liability as the foremost policy justifying the imposition of strict
products liability on sales of used products.41
40. This Comment relies on the Tillman and Tauber-Arons cases in advocating a
conditional imposition of strict liability. However, these cases are not the only authority
advocating a conditional imposition. See also Fischer, Products Liability-Functionally
Imposed Strict Liability, 32 OKLA.L. REV.93 (1979); Fischer, Products Liability-The
Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339 (1974). Professor Fischer has written the
following:
A preferred approach is for the judge to decide as a matter of law whether
a given case is an appropriate one for strict liability. In making this decision,
he should systematically analyze all factors bearing on the question of whether
the policies of risk spreading and deterrence can be advanced by the imposition of liability without unduly inhibiting industry from continuing to supply
useful products.
Fischer, Products Liability-Functionally Imposed Strict Liability, 32 OKLA.L. REV.93,
114 (1979).
Professor Fischer suggests that the following factora be considered:
I. Risk Spreading
A. From the point of view of consumer.
1. Ability of consumer to bear loss.
2. Feasibility and effectiveness of self-protective measures.
a. Knowledge of risk.
b. Ability to control danger.
c. Feasibility of deciding against use of product.
B. From the point of view of manufacturer.
1. Knowledge of risk.
2. Accuracy of prediction of losses.
3. Size of losses.
4. Availability of insurance.
5. Ability of manufacturer to self-insure.
6. Effect of increased prices on industry.
7. Public necessity for the product.
8. Deterrent effect on the development of new products.
11. Safety Incentive
A. Likelihood of future product improvement.
B. Existence of additional precautions that can presently be taken.
C. Availability of safer substitutes.
Id. at 114-15.
41. One court described its imposition of strict liability on the seller of used bricks
as being consistent with the Restatement: "These comments were before the courts
which have adopted Sec. 402A, and there is no reason for asawning that these courts
were unaware of the fact that comment c clearly adopts the theory of enterprise liability
as the basis for the rule." Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302, 310 (Tex. Civ. App.
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Although the imposition of strict liability and its consequent insurance costs on the seller of used goods may "overstate" the costs to society of design and manufacturing defects,
this is not the case with defects that arise after the product has
left the original distribution chain. Manufacturers are ultimately
responsible for design and manufacturing defects; they do not
insure against nor are they responsible for defects that arise after the product has left the original chain of distribution. Enterprise liability therefore demands that used-products sellers be
held strictly liable for safety defects in order to protect both
buyers and unrelated third parties who may be injured by
them.42
Although sellers of used products must be held strictly liable for safety defects, there are limitations to this liability. The
condition in the used product causing the injury for which the
plaintiff sues must in fact be a defect rather than mere wear." A
defect is a condition in the product that presents unreasonable
danger that would not be contemplated by the ordinary con~ u m e r .Restatement
~~
(Second) of Torts Section 402A bases
strict products liability on defects which are unreasonably dangerous. Some states have abandoned the unreasonably dangerous requirement, but even in those states a defect is nonetheless
determined in terms of the consumer's reasonable expe~tation.~~
Thus, it appears to be appropriate to hold used products sellers
1975). See also Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. at 284, 336 A.2d
at 69.
42. See Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 61
(1975); Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
Even where there are no implied representations between sellers and buyers of used
products, public policy favors eliminating safety defects from used products because they
may harm unrelated third parties. See, e.g., Cornelius v. Bay Motors Inc., 258 Or. 564,
484 P.2d 299 (1971), where an unrelated third party was "rear-ended" and injured when
the brakes on a used vehicle purchased that same day failed to stop the car. See also
Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. at 290-93, 336 A.2d at 69-71.
43. One commentator concluded, "Since the ordinary consumer should reasonably
expect that a product will have a finite life, strict liability will not be imposed where the
supra
defect arises simply because the product has worn out." W. KIMBLE& R. LESHER,
note 13, at 113. See also Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 337, 340 (1973).
44. RESTA~MENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS5 402A, Comments g & i (1965).
45. In Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App.3d 268, 161
Cal. Rptr. 789 (1980), the test of a defective product in California was set forth: "The
'unreasonably dangerous' test has been rejected in California as a necessary factor.
(Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp. (1972) 8 Cal. 3d 121, 135, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d
1153.) However, failure to satisfy 'ordinary consumer' expectations is still a basis for
strict liability under California law. (Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978) 20 Cal. 3d
413, 435, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443.)" Id. at 279 n.1, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 795 n. 1.
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strictly liable for safety defects, i.e., defects arising out of parts
ordinarily expected to be regularly maintained and replaced.46
In addition to the safety-defect limitation on the used-products seller's strict liability, the defect causing the injury must
exist at the time the product was sold. Defects arising after the
product is sold should not give rise to strict liabilit~.~'
Determining when the defect arises should be a question of fact. However,
defects in used products may be of two types: presently existing
defects and developing defects." When presently existing defects are found in a used product, the seller will be held strictly
liable on proof of that fact. However, when the product is dangerous as a result of a developing defect, the trier of fact must
determine whether a reasonable person would have had the
product serviced or repaired before the time when the injury occurred. Since strict liability is limited to safety defects, which
may occur only in those parts ordinarily expected to be regularly
maintained or replaced, a reasonable man test seems appropriate in deciding whether the plaintiff should have had the part
serviced himself before it developed into the defect that resulted
in his injury.
46. See Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62
(1975):
Justifiable expectations for safety run to ordinary parts expected to receive regular maintenance and replacement, e.g., brake shoes and Wigs, steering linkage, exhaust system, etc. On the other hand, surface dents, rust or
metal fatigue resulting from mere old age would be defects the risk of which a
buyer reasonably may be expected to absorb without undue threat to the public at large.
Id. at 290, 336 A.2d at 69.
Safety defects may be further defined as something so vital to the safe operation of
the product that it is expected that the used-products seller will check it thoroughly
before he sells it to the consumer. On a used car, for example, such safety defects would
probably include no more than the exhaust system, steering and suspension systems (insupra note 13, at
cluding tires), and the brake system. See aho W. KIMBLE& R. LESHER,
113; Annot., supra note 7, at 340.
(SECOND)
OF TORTS8 402A(2)(b) (1965).
47. See RESTATEMENT
48. An example of a presently existing defect may be seen in McLain v. Hodge, 474
S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), where the plaintiff purchased a used gun with a defective ejector which caused a cartridge to explode in his face. An example of a developing
defect may be seen in Cornelius v. Bay Motors Inc., 258 Or. 564, 484 P.2d 299 (1971),
where the "cups" in the master cylinder of a used car's brake system were in the process
of deteriorating. The day before the car was purchased, the brake system operated
safely; on the day of the sale the brakes failed, causing a rear-end collision. For an example of a successful defense based on the post-purchase occurrence of the defect, see
Grady v. Kenny Ross Chevrolet Co., 332 F. Supp. 689 (W.D. Pa. 1971), where the exhaust system was determined to have become defective only after the sale, resulting in
no liability for the seller.
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The underlying reasons for a sale of a particular used product may also limit a used-product seller's liability. Where the
product is sold with the implicit understanding that it is virtually or completely worn out or in a dangerous condition and that
the buyer will have to invest additional time and money in the
product in order to make it safe or functional, strict liability
should not be imposed. This situation or limitation will most
often arise in the sale of antiques." Even with non-antiques,
when a seller gives explicit and adequate warnings of the inherent dangers in the product and of the way to use the product to
avoid injury, and these warnings are ignored, strict liability will
not be i m p o ~ e d . ~
When a plaintiff is injured by a safety defect, the plaintiff
may hold the seller of used goods strictly liable by establishing
the following:
1. That the product was defective, i.e., in a condition unreasonably dangerous when sold to him, based upon the reasonable expectations of an ordinary consumer (safety defect);
49. Commenting on this facet of the problem, the court in Turner v. International
Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (1975), stated the following:
Looking at the used automobile situation, one can readily envision an antique car buff or "hot rod" enthusiast purchasing a car which is defective in
many respects and where the relationship between the buyer and seller is such
that both reasonably expect that all aspects of the automobile will be separately appraised and all defects corrected by the purchaser. In this connection
see Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 62, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 700, 377 P.2d 897, 900 (1963 Sup. Ct.), in which Justice Traynor stated
that a manufacturer "is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to
have a defect that causes injury to a human being."
Id. at 292, 336 A.2d at 71 (emphasis in original).
50. Note the specific warnings and the denial of strict liability to sellers of used
products in Rix v. Reeves, 23 Ariz. App. 243,532 P.2d 185 (1975), and Pridgett v. Jackson Iron & Metal Co., 253 So.2d 837 (Miss. 1971).
As a matter of procedural convenience for the plaintiff, when something can be classified as a design or manufacturing defect and as a safety defect, the plaintiff should be
allowed to join as joint tortfeasors both the manufacturer and the used-goods seller. This
situation might arise, for example, when the original brake shoes on a used automobile
wear out prematurely and an accident occurs. Since brakes fall within the classification
of a safety defect, the used-products seller should .have inspected them. At the same
time, however, it is likely that the materials used by the manufacturer of the brakes were
substandard, thus constituting a defect in the brake design. Even if there is no special
relationship between the used-products seller and the manufacturer, the plaintiff should
be able to sue both as joint tortfeasors. However, if the defect is clearly not a safety
defect, then the plaintWs only possible cause of action would be against the manufacturer. For some helpful background in this area, see L. FRUMER& M. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 13, at 5 16A(4)(b)(i)and W. KIMBLE& R. LESHER,
supra note 13, at 5 54.
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and,
2. That the defect caused injury to the plaintiff before a
reasonable man would have had the part replaced or serviced.

The defendant may establish any one of the following as a
defense:
1. That no safety defect existed, i.e., that the injury was a
result of wear in parts that a reasonable consumer should not
expect to have been regularly maintained or replaced;
2. That the defect arose after the sale, not before;
3. That the basis of the bargain or essence of the agreement was that the plaintiff would invest his own time and
money in the product to make it safe; or
4. That the defendant gave an adequate and explicit waming which the plaintiff disregarded.

Steven J. Christiansen

